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Abstract
We estimate the effects of labor market entry conditions on wages for male individuals
first entering the Austrian labor market between 1978 and 2000. We find a large nega-
tive effect of unfavorable entry conditions on starting wages as well as a sizeable negative
long-run effect. Specifically, we estimate that a one percentage point increase in the initial
local unemployment rate is associated with an approximate shortfall in lifetime earnings
of 6.5%. We also show that bad entry conditions are associated with lower quality of a
worker’s first job and that initial wage shortfalls associated with bad entry conditions only
partially evaporate upon involuntary job change. These and additional findings support
the view that initial job assignment, in combination with accumulation of occupation or
industry-specific human capital while on this first job, plays a key role in generating the
observed wage persistencies.
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1 Introduction
The recent economic crisis has renewed academic interest in the potential impact of business
cycle fluctuations on labor markets (e.g. Elsby et al., 2010). However, while labor economists
have studied the short-run association between local labor market conditions and real wages
extensively for quite some time (e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990), longer-run effects of
business cycle fluctuations on individuals’ wages have only more recently caught the attention of
empirical research.1 Clearly, in the longer run, even small initial wage shortfalls may eventually
accrue to substantial overall losses in lifetime earnings if initial wage losses resulting from poor
entry conditions persist.2
Indeed, recent empirical evidence suggests that substantial losses in lifetime earnings result
from entering the labor market during an economic downturn, as opposed to entering during
an expansion. Oreopoulos et al. (2006, 2008) explore the effects of entering the labor market
during a recession on individuals’ earnings, using data on Canadian college graduates who
entered the labor market between 1982 and 1999. They find a substantial initial wage penalty
of about 9% that only fades to zero after the first decade of a worker’s career. A similar
result is reported in Kahn (2010), who focuses on male college graduates in the United States
graduating sometime between 1979 and 1988. She finds that the group graduating in the worst
economic situation incurs a wage loss of up to 13% each year, relative to those graduating in
the best initial conditions, and that this initial wage loss persists over the first 20 years of
workers’ labor market career. Similar results are reported in Oyer (2006), who shows that
PhD students in economics are considerably more likely to get a position at one of the top
universities in the United States if they graduate in times when the demand for economists is
high. In a related study, he finds that those MBA students who complete their training during
a recession suffer from negative effects on wages (Oyer, 2008). In both studies, the long-term
1Most studies estimating the short-run association between fluctuations in local unemployment rates and
wages find that wages vary negatively with local unemployment. This negative association is a very robust
empirical pattern; it has been shown to exist for a wide range of different countries, using very different sources
of data and diverse empirical specifications. See Nijkamp et al. (2005) for a comprehensive survey of this
literature.
2Previous research has shown that the early years in a worker’s labor market career are of special importance
(Gardecki and Neumark, 1998; Neumark, 2002). In terms of wages, Murphy and Welch (1990) estimate that
almost 80% of all (i.e. lifetime) wage increases accrue within the first ten years of labor market experience.
Moreover, movements across jobs are considerably more likely at the beginning of a worker’s career than later
on (Topel and Ward, 1992).
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effects on income appear to be caused by the fact that diverse employers hire workers entering
the labor market under different conditions, therefore giving them access to distinct jobs.
The entry job is thus significant for the future career, and this appears to be of particular
importance for highly educated individuals for whom the transition in and out of attractive
positions is very low.3 Mansour (2009) also focuses on college graduates in the US and again
finds negative and persistent wage effects from entry into the labor force during a recession.
Moreover, he shows that failure to account for endogenous sample composition underestimates
both the immediate wage effects as well as the persistence of wage effects resulting from initial
labor market shocks.
Empirical evidence for countries outside the US and Canada yields broadly similar findings.
Kwon et al. (2010) mainly use data from the Swedish labor market.4 They find that workers
who enter the labor market during a boom are not only paid higher wages, but that they
are also promoted more quickly to higher ranks than those who enter during an economic
downturn. Stevens (2007) finds significant negative, albeit small effects of initial conditions on
wages in Germany (much smaller than those found in the US and Canada). In contrast to all
other studies, however, she finds that wage losses from poor entry conditions do not fade away,
but actually increase over time.5 The available empirical evidence also underlines the fact
that negative wage effects of initial labor market conditions are not confined to highly skilled
workers. Genda et al. (2010) focus on a separate comparison between more and less educated
men in Japan and the United States in the effects of initial conditions. They find negative
effects of initial conditions for more highly skilled workers in both countries. However, they
only find negative wage effects for less skilled workers in Japan. They argue that the specific
3One important concern regarding the validity of these results is that schooling and first entry into the labor
force may be endogenous both because individuals may choose to stay in school or continue further training
when faced with high unemployment and low starting wages. Indeed, several studies find that enrollment rates
are high when unemployment is high and the opportunity costs of schooling are low (e.g. Clark, 2009). In line
with these findings, both Kahn (2010) and Oreopoulos et al. (2006, 2008) find the duration of schooling to
be endogenous. Both tackle the endogeneity problem by instrumenting the unemployment rate at the time of
labor market entry with either the prevailing unemployment rate at a lower age or that in the predicted year
of graduation. Mansour (2009) presents direct evidence on sample selection over the business cycle based on
AFQT scores.
4Studies for European countries have mainly focused on the long-run effects of initial conditions on employ-
ment rather than wages up until now (e.g. Burgess et al., 2003; Raaum and Roed, 2006).
5A similar analysis of wage effects for firm entry cohorts in the German manufacturing sector is given in
von Wachter and Bender (2008). However, their analysis is not confined to new labor market entrants but
covers workers of all experience levels; their results are therefore not directly comparable to the other studies
mentioned.
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hiring system and employment protection drive the persistence of the effects for Japanese,
while the market for less skilled workers in the United States may indeed be quite close to a
competitive market. Consistent with this finding, Kondo (2008) reports that the initial effect of
entering the labor market during a recession on wages is less persistent for less skilled workers
and for workers with weak labor market attachment in the US.
In this paper, we present estimates of the long-run effects of business cycle fluctuations
on young males’ wage profiles in the Austrian labor market and derive an empirical estimate
of the associated loss in lifetime earnings due to entering the labor force during a recession,
as opposed to entry during average aggregate conditions or during a boom. We do so using
social security records from Austria that contain detailed individual earnings and employment
histories for the universe of private-sector employees from 1972 until 2005. We complement the
available empirical evidence on the long-run wage effects of labor market entry conditions with
an analysis for Austria, a labor market characterized by a high level of employment protection
and a centralized wage bargaining structure. We focus on low and medium-skilled workers,
while most of the mentioned studies focus on higher or even highest-skilled workers (in terms
of formal education). Note, however, that workers in the Austrian labor market typically have
some, potentially very specialized, vocational training.6 Moreover, and in contrast to Stevens
(2007) and Kwon et al. (2010) – the only other studies focusing on European labor markets –
we take endogenous labor market entry over the business cycle into account in the empirical
analysis. Indeed, our analysis shows that there is substantial positive selection of workers in
times of high initial unemployment and that, as a consequence, dealing with sample selection
is in fact crucial for our conclusions regarding the long-term wage effects of initial labor market
conditions.
In the second part of the analysis, we try to discriminate between different mechanisms
that can potentially explain persistent cohort effects in wages resulting from differences in
labor market entry conditions. Specifically, initial job or task assignment may be important in
the longer run if employers assign otherwise identical workers to lower quality jobs or tasks in
recession, and if jobs or tasks offer different opportunities for the accrual of human capital (e.g.
6A significant part of the initial vocational training in Austria is provided by dual apprenticeship training
schemes, i.e. practical training provided by firms coupled with part-time compulsory attendance at a vocational
school. Apprenticeships last from two to four years, depending on occupation. Full-time vocational and technical
schools provide an important alternative to apprenticeship training, and also last up to four years. Details are
available from the report by the Federal Ministry for Education, the Arts and Culture (2008).
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Gibbons and Waldman, 2006). Alternatively, workers’ initial job or task assignment may have
long lasting effects on wages if workers accumulate human capital while on the job that is not
fully transferable to other jobs or tasks because it is specific to a worker’s task, occupation,
or industry. We therefore complement our main analysis with an analysis of the effects of
initial labor market conditions on the quality of a worker’s first job against this background.7
Third, we study whether and the extent to which wage changes following involuntary first job
moves (i.e. involuntary job changes away from a worker’s first employer), as well as wages with
the old and the new employers depend on initial labor market conditions. The basic idea in
this part of the analysis is that the elasticity of the wage of the new (second) employer with
respect to initial labor market conditions informs us about the importance of differences in
the accumulation of human capital while on the job and the importance of explanations that
do not rest on underlying differences in productivity such as downwardly rigid wage contracts.
Finally, we complement our empirical analysis with results for selected subsamples, such as
blue and white-collar workers, as well as for additional outcome variables, such as different
measures of job mobility.
Our key findings are the following. First, we find a substantial negative effect of unfavorable
labor market conditions on starting wages and that this initial negative wage effect is persistent,
resulting in sizeable negative effects of poor entry conditions on lifetime earnings. Specifically,
our estimates imply that a one percentage point increase in the initial local unemployment
rate is associated with a loss in lifetime earnings of about 6.5%. A second main finding is
that endogenous labor market entry is a crucial issue, suggesting that there are substantial
fluctuations in the recruitment of new workers over the business cycle. Third, we find that
labor market entry in times of high unemployment is associated with a lower average quality
of a worker’s initial job. Fourth, we find that wage losses from having entered the labor market
during a recession only partially evaporate upon involuntary termination of first employment.
These findings strongly support the view that initial job and/or task assignment is important
in explaining the observed wage persistencies resulting from labor market entry conditions, and
our additional results for different subsamples and for alternative outcomes are also in line with
this view. On the other hand, a share of workers’ initial wage losses do vanish upon involuntary
7Consistent with this line of argument, Kwon et al. (2010) find that workers who enter the labor market
during a boom are promoted more quickly and to higher ranks than those who enter during a recession, and
Mansour (2009) shows that workers entering in a recession are initially assigned to lower paying jobs.
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first job change, and thus mechanisms unrelated to human capital, such as downwardly rigid
wage contracts or temporary rents, are also important in explaining the long run wage effects
resulting from variation in initial labor market conditions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our data
source, details the sample selection process, and discusses the construction of our key measures.
Section 3 presents the econometric approach for estimating long-run wage effects of initial labor
market conditions along with our main results. We then study the impact of initial labor market
conditions on the quality of initial job assignment in section 4. Section 5 studies how changes
in earnings resulting from involuntary job loss depend on initial labor market conditions. In
section 6 we present complementary additional results for several subsamples and for different
outcomes than wages. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data and Sample
2.1 Data Source
We use individual-level social security records from the Austrian Social Security Database
(ASSD), a data source described in more detail in Zweimu¨ller et al. (2009). The ASSD sample
we use basically covers the universe of Austrian private sector workers from January 1972 until
December 2005. The data contain complete and precise information about individuals’ annual
earnings and daily employment histories. The data are therefore ideally suited for studying
the impact of labor market shocks on long-run wage profiles because they allow us to construct
individual wage profiles for a large number of labor market entrants over a relatively long
period of time.
2.2 Key Measures
Our dependent variable for most of the analysis is the real daily wage, i.e. the real wage per
actual day of work, adjusted to 2007 prices. Wages are deflated with the consumer price index
and include additional/special payments such as a 13th month’s salary or holiday pay.8 Real
8The Austrian Central Social Security Administration collects these data with the purpose of administer-
ing and calculating entitlements to old-age pension benefits. For this reason, the ASSD includes precise and
comprehensive information on annual earnings and daily employment histories. However, contributions to the
old-age pension system are capped because old-age pension benefits are limited to a maximum level. As a
consequence, annual earnings are only recorded up to the threshold which guarantees the maximum benefit
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daily wages are computed as the average earnings over all employers in a given year. That is,
we first sum total annual earnings over all employers for any individual. We then divide overall
earnings by the total number of days worked in a given year, also summed over all employers
for a given individual and taking overlapping employment spells into account.
The regressor of main interest is the annual male unemployment rate, our measure for
external labor market conditions at the time individuals first enter into the labor force. We
computed annual male unemployment rates from the individual-level employment histories
contained in the ASSD raw data. This procedure has the advantage that we can calculate
unemployment rates back until 1972 (compared to published statistics, which reach back until
1978 only) and at different levels of cross-sectional aggregation.9 Unless noted otherwise, we
use the male unemployment rate for all workers aged between 16 and 65 at the state level as
our main regressor.10
2.3 Sample Selection
Mainly for conceptual reasons, but also due to some data limitations, we do not work with the
universe of all labor market entrants but only with a specifically selected sample. First, we
restrict our attention to male entrants only. On the one hand, female labor supply behavior
over the life cycle is much more difficult to model than male labor supply. On the other hand,
we believe that the fact that most men work full-time allows us to largely circumvent the
problem that the ASSD does not contain information on working hours. Second, we select
those workers who start their first regular employment spell sometime between 1978 and 2000,
allowing us to observe at least five additional years of earnings for each worker because the
data run until the end of 2005 (see also appendix A). As a final restriction, we focus on
level (“Ho¨chstbemessungsgrundlage”, HBGr). Similarly, there is a base threshold below which no (otherwise
mandatory) social security payments accrue (“Geringfu¨gigkeitsgrenze”, GfGr). The two censoring points vary
over time in real terms: The lower censoring point increased from about 14e in 1978 to about 26e in 2005 (per
day worked); the upper censoring point increased from about 78e to 126e per workday over the same period
of time.
9We decided to extract yearly male unemployment rates for the age groups 16 to 65 and 16 to 25, both at
the state (”Bundesland”) level and at the common classification of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) level.
At the NUTS level, we use the most disaggregated level available (NUTS-3), which corresponds to one or more
political districts in Austria. There are total of 9 different states and 35 different NUTS-3 regions in Austria.
Yearly unemployment rates are within-year averages of monthly unemployment rates.
10It is not obvious whether the youth unemployment rate would be preferable to the overall unemployment
rate because the youth unemployment rate may suffer from endogeneity bias. Also, because Austria’s youth
unemployment rate is very low compared to most other countries (e.g. Breen, 2005), the choice between the two
is ultimately not important (as we will actually show later on; see table 3).
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workers aged between 16 and 21 at the time they first enter the labor force (i.e. start their first
regular employment spell).11 This restriction effectively serves as a restriction on individuals’
schooling duration (see also appendix A).12 Essentially, this restriction excludes individuals
with higher education (most importantly, individuals with a university degree), but it should
include all or most individuals with an apprenticeship training or an education of similar length
and scope, such as full-time vocational school.13 Our final sample thus consists of male low-
and medium-skilled labor market entrants who started their first regular employment between
1978 and 2000. We can observe these workers’ full labor market career from the year they first
enter into the labor force until the year 2005.
2.4 Sample Description
Because we can follow all individuals from the year of their first regular employment until the
end of the data in the year 2005, the resulting data set would have been too large from a
practical point of view. In the following, we therefore work with a 30% random sample of all
labor market entrants aged between 16 and 21 when first entering into the labor force. This
sample contains 220,214 unique individuals and about 3.35 million individual wage observations
(i.e. observations at the level of individual×year).
Table 1
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our final analysis sample. The first panel shows
individual-level characteristics. The average labor market entrant in our sample is about 19
11Because the ASSD does not contain a comprehensive measure for schooling, we also use age at entry into
the labor force as proxy for education in the regressions below. To mitigate potential collinearity with year of
birth and year of entry, we use a slightly different variable as proxy in the regressions. Specifically, we use the
smaller of age at start of first regular employment and age at start of first registered unemployment spell.
12We focus on a sample of labor market entrants so that each entry cohort is balanced with respect to the
potential range of schooling, meaning that the potential range of schooling (i.e. age at entry) is the same for
each year of entry considered in the analysis. In order to determine the start of an individual’s first job within
the full range of “education‘’ in each year, we had to restrict the sample period to the years 1978-2000. In the
year 1977, for example, we cannot exactly determine the first entry into the labor market for an individual aged
21 because this individual might have already entered the labor market with age 16, i.e. in the year 1971. In
this case, his entry is not observed in the data simply because the data do not start before 1972.
13Several arguments motivate the restriction on schooling. First, the timing of first labor market entry, and
thus the duration of schooling, may be endogenous. However, less skilled workers are presumably less likely to
manipulate the duration of schooling. Also, unobserved heterogeneity resulting from, say, unobserved differences
in inherent ability, is arguably a more urgent problem for higher-skilled workers. Moreover, we think that our
proxy for schooling works best for less-educated workers. Finally, only including less-skilled workers in the
sample is an effective way of dealing with right-censored wages (see also appendix A).
8
years old when starting his first regular employment spell, and he holds his first job for almost
three years. The average age at the start of the first job dovetails with the fact that mandatory
schooling ends in the year when individuals attain age 15 and that apprenticeships usually last
for two to four years. The high fraction of blue-collar occupations is consistent with our inten-
tion of only including individuals who received some kind of vocational training. Interestingly,
a substantial fraction of the sample (about a third) experiences some unemployment before
starting the first regular employment spell (these individuals are registered for unemployment
benefits on average for somewhat more than one month). Consistent with this, we find that
age at first entry (our proxy for schooling) is about half a year lower than age at the start
of the first regular job, reflecting the fact that the transition from education to work often
involves short periods of non-employment.
The next panel shows male unemployment rates at the state and NUTS-3 unit levels as well
as the aggregate number of labor market entrants at the state level (see footnote 9). The first
two unemployment rates refer to the male working-age population, while the other two refer
to the population of young workers. The unemployment rate in the year of labor market entry
averages about 6.6%, irrespective of the chosen aggregation level. Youth unemployment rates
are somewhat lower than overall unemployment rates and equal about 5% on average. Again,
there is very little difference across aggregation levels. Finally, about 3,750 male individuals
(aged between 16 and 21) enter the labor market in any given state and year.
The bottom of table 1 shows that our sample predominantly consists of individuals working
in either manufacturing, construction, or in wholesale and retail trade (representing 41.8%,
20.2%, and 15.9% of the sample, respectively). There are also substantial shares of individuals
working in gastronomy and hotel business, transportation, finance, as well as for lobbies and
social security agencies. Again, this reflects the fact that we mainly selected lower and medium-
skilled individuals for the analysis. The large number of employees of first employer (almost
580 employees) hides the fact that most firms are small and thus that most individuals actually
work in small firms. In fact, about 40% of all entrants start their first regular employment in
a firm with 25 or fewer employees. Also, the firms in our sample predominantly engage males,
probably simply reflecting the overall gender distribution across industries.
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3 The Persistence of Initial Labor Market Shocks
We start with a simple graphical depiction of our two key measures (i.e. cohorts’ wage profiles
and the initial local unemployment rate). First, figure 1 shows wage profiles by entry cohort for
all labor market cohorts who first entered the labor force between 1978 and 2000. The black
dots therefore represent average starting wages for each entry cohort and the dashed grey line
thus shows how starting wages evolve over time. Clearly, real starting wages have increased
significantly over the period of analysis, from about 38e in 1978 to about 50e in 2000. Also
note that there is some cyclical movement in starting wages over time which we expect to be
related to economic conditions prevailing in that year.
Figure 1
The solid colored lines, on the other hand, represent long-run wage profiles of cohorts
entering the labor market in different years. Cohorts’ wages clearly follow an approximate
concave path over time, implying that wage growth is highest in earlier working years and
then strongly flattens later on. The figure shows, for example, that the 1978 entry cohort
starts with a real wage of about 38e per workday and experiences a raise in real wage up to
about 97e by the year 2005. On average, this cohort’s compensation has therefore more than
doubled in real terms within the first 27 years of labor market experience. Focusing again
on the 1978 entry cohort, we see that this cohort’s average wage has grown by approximately
146% (= [exp(.9)− 1] · 100%) in the first 27 years of experience. Evidently, most of this wage
increase happens at the early stage of the labor market career (i.e. the wage increase in the
first ten years equals about 86% (= [exp(.62)− 1] · 100%)).14
Figure 2
Panel (a) of figure 2 shows the evolution of state level unemployment rates which we use
as our indicator for external labor market conditions at the time individuals first enter the
labor force. This figure shows that the period from 1978 to 2000 covers several periods of
14Wage profiles of different entry cohorts have somewhat distinct overall shapes. More specifically, the figure
shows that returns to experience generally decrease over time, meaning that younger entry cohorts have consid-
erably lower returns to labor market experience than older cohorts. For example, the 1995 cohort only realizes
an average wage increase of about 58% (= [exp(.46) − 1] · 100%) in the first ten years, thus less smaller than
that of the corresponding increase of the 1978 entry cohort.
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both boom and downturn, and that the identifying variation in initial labor market conditions
therefore does not only stem from a few neighboring labor market cohorts. The figure makes
it also clear that states not only differ in the level of unemployment but also with respect
to cyclical variations around a longer run trend: although all states see an increase over the
whole observation period in general, there are marked cyclical differences across states and
districts.15
Moreover, the lower panel of figure 2 shows that our observation period spans several ups
and downs of the business cycle, and that there is considerable differentiation in the strength
of these variations across states. We thus have both sufficient cross-sectional and longitudinal
variation in our key regressor that we can use to pin down the effect of local business cycle
fluctuations on wages.
3.1 Econometric Framework
Because we primarily aim at estimating the long-run impact of economic shocks at the time
individuals started their first jobs, we must take care to allow the association between initial
conditions and wage to become weaker or stronger as labor market experience increases while
also using a generally flexible functional form of wage profiles. Taking these issues into account,
our basic econometric model is the following:
ln(yit) = ur
0
j[i]α1 + κ(expit)α2 + [ur
0
j[i] · κ(expit)]α3 + urj[i]tδ1 + [urj[i]t · κ(expit)]δ2
+ ln(n0j[i])β1 + xiβ2 + ψj + tiγj + it, (1)
where yit denotes the real daily wage of individual i in calendar year t, expit potential labor
market experience of i in year t, and ur0j[i] the unemployment rate as prevailing in region j
at the time individual i first entered the labor market. Function κ(·) denotes that we allow
for a flexible functional form with respect to labor market experience.16 Note that we allow
15For example, and as highlighted in the figure, Burgenland (located in southeastern Austria) experienced
a huge increase in the unemployment rate from about 3% in the late 1970s to about 8% in the first half of
the 1980s, and then to about 9% in the second half of the 1980s. Vorarlberg (situated in western Austria),
in contrast, experienced only a modest increase from about 1% on the 1970s to about 3% in the 1980s. In
1992, however, Vorarlberg underwent a sharp decline in the local labor market conditions, when unemployment
jumped from about 3% to about 7–8%.
16Specifically, we include the first three polynomial terms of potential labor market experience. We chose
the number of polynomial terms on the basis of a non-parametric, and therefore fully flexible, wage-experience
model. The first three polynomial terms appear sufficient to reproduce the wage-experience profile predicted
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the effect of the initial unemployment rate on current wages to vary as potential labor market
experience increases by including interaction terms between the experience polynomials and the
initial unemployment rate. We also include the current local unemployment rate, urj[i]t, and its
interactions with potential labor market experience κ(exp) to control for the effect of current
labor market conditions on wages (while allowing current conditions to have different effects
on workers with different experience). We further include the number of labor market entrants
aged 16 to 21, n0j[i], to control for large demographic shifts within the considered birth cohorts.
We include additional control variables in some specifications, denoted by vector xi. Note
that the controls variables are predetermined in the sense that they relate to an individual’s
first regular employment spell or to the time before having started to work (i.e. there is no
time index for the controls). Finally, we include a set of state dummies (denoted by ψj) and
state-specific quadratic time trends (denoted by tiγj) in most specifications.
17 Parameters α1
to α3 describe wage-experience profiles as a function of the initial unemployment rate and
are the parameters of main interest. Specifically, α1 is the elasticity of wages with respect to
the initial unemployment rate in the year of first entry (i.e. in the year where labor market
experience is equal to 0), while α3 tells us how the effect of initial conditions changes as labor
market experience increases.
One important complication implied by the specification given by equation (1) relates
to the fact that the local initial unemployment rate does not vary over time for any given
individual. For this reason we cannot use standard panel data estimators such as the fixed-
effects or first-differences estimator because these methods not only eliminate all unobserved
time-invariant heterogeneity but also all variation in the key regressor. We therefore rely
on estimation methods that use the untransformed data. Another critical issue is potential
endogeneity regarding the initial unemployment rate due to sample selection over the business
cycle. If the composition of entry cohorts changes endogenously over the business cycle, this
may lead to inconsistent estimates of the effect of initial conditions on wages.18 To address
from a corresponding non-parametric specification.
17We include a common quadratic time trend in those specifications without state-specific time trends.
18This line of argument has been put forth by Bils (1985) and more recently by Solon et al. (1994) and
Blundell et al. (2003). In fact, the timing of labor force entry and thus the composition of labor market cohorts
may be endogenous for several distinct reasons. First, some potential labor market entrants may refrain from
entering the labor market altogether. Second, both the choice of education as well as the duration of schooling
may be endogenous, as both job prospects are weak and opportunity costs of schooling low in times of high
unemployment. The most likely reason for endogenous labor market entry is the fact that some workers simply
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this issue, we mainly rely on estimates where we instrument unemployment at first entry
with the unemployment rate at age 16.19 In fact, a comparison between estimates that take
selection into account and those that do not do so unambiguously shows that this issue is
crucial in our context and we thus focus on these instrumental variable estimates (see section
3.3 below). Finally, we have to consider that our key regressor is observed at a higher level
of aggregation than the dependent variable, a situation that may lead to grossly misleading
statistical inference (Moulton, 1986). All standard errors that we report are therefore clustered
by cells defined by year at first entry × state of first entry (there are 9 states and 23 entry
years, resulting in 207 distinct cells).20
3.2 Main Results: Initial Labor Market Conditions and Wages
We first discuss instrumental variables estimates of variations of the basic regression model
given by equation (1). Table 2 shows point estimates of the parameters (i.e. α1 and α3)
describing the effect of initial conditions on wages at the top and estimated semi-elasticities
of wages with respect to the initial local unemployment rate at specific values of potential
labor market experience (i.e. potential labor market experience of 0, 5, 10, 15, and 20 years,
respectively) in the middle of the table. For example, εyur(5) denotes the estimated semi-
elasticity of the real daily wage with respect to the initial unemployment rate at five years
of potential labor market experience. It thus corresponds to the estimated relative change in
wages resulting from a one percentage point increase in the initial unemployment rate.
Table 2
The model in the first column only includes the log of the number of labor market entrants
aged between 15 and 21, the current unemployment rate and the interaction terms with poten-
tial labor market experience, a full set of state dummies, and a common quadratic time trend
delay their entry when faced with unfavorable entry conditions, either by registering for unemployment benefits
or staying out of the labor force until they find a job. Whatever the underlying reason, if those workers who do
not immediately get a job are a selected group of all workers who intend to enter employment in a given year,
then the composition of the actual entrants changes along with corresponding changes in the unemployment
rate and thus potentially biases the estimated effect of the initial unemployment rate on wages.
19Kahn (2010), Kondo (2008) and Oreopoulos et al. (2006, 2008) use a similar instrumental variable strategy.
OLS and IV estimates are similar in Oreopoulos et al. (2006, 2008), but IV are substantially larger in Kondo
(2008). Kahn (2010) only reports IV estimates. Kwon et al. (2010) and Stevens (2007), the two European
studies, only show OLS estimates.
20We also computed standard errors that simultaneously account for clustering at both levels for our main
estimates. This yields standard errors that are virtually indistinguishable from those actually reported.
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across states as additional controls. As expected, there is an immediate large negative effect of
the initial local unemployment on wages in the year of entry. Specifically, the semi-elasticity
of wages with respect to the initial unemployment rate equals -0.27 in the year of entry. The
corresponding standard error equals 0.061, and the immediate wage effect is thus highly signif-
icant. Furthermore, the middle panel of the table shows that there is substantial persistence
of this negative wage effect. According to the estimates from the first specification, a negative
and significant effect of initial labor market conditions remains as much as twenty years after
first entry into the labor market, but the wage effect clearly fades away over time.
We include state-specific quadratic time trends instead of imposing a common time trend
across states in the second column. This may be rationalized on the observation that the states
differ markedly with respect to overall economic conditions (see figure 2). The estimated semi-
elasticity in the year of first entry increases and amounts to -0.36 (with a standard error
of 0.091). The immediate wage effect is thus about a third larger than the corresponding
effect from the first specification. Consistent with this finding, the longer-run wage effects
also become more pronounced in this specification, as shown in the middle of the table. For
example, the relative wage effect at five years of potential labor market experience increases
from -0.13 to -0.17 (a relative increase by almost a third).
The estimates shown in the third column come from a regression specification that includes
state-specific time trends and additional control variables at the individual or at the firm level.
These additional controls relate to a worker’s first regular employment spell or the time before
that.21 Taking these additional individual-level controls into account decreases the short-run
effect of the initial unemployment rate markedly (the short run effect shrinks by about a
third, compared to the second column). Nonetheless, the estimated immediate semi-elasticity
still equals -0.209 with a standard error of 0.073, and it is thus still substantial and highly
significant. The longer-run pattern of wage effects also changes substantially, as the impact
of initial conditions on wages is substantially reduced at any value of potential labor market
experience when controlling for differences in these observable characteristics. In fact, the wage
effects at higher values of experience decrease to a larger relative amount.
21Specifically, we include our proxy for education, an individual’s age at first entry into the labor force, and
two indicator variables for blue or white-collar occupation at first regular employment. Concerning the initial
employer, we include the number of employees and the fraction of the workforce that is female, as well as location
(at the state level) and industry affiliation (15 broad categories).
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The fourth column adds a full set of dummies for year of entry, thus picking up any system-
atic but unobserved differences across entry cohorts such as differences in average educational
quality (note that we include an explicit control for cohort size). As expected, the inclusion of
entry cohort dummies has a huge effect on the estimated wage effects of initial conditions. The
immediate effect drops to -0.111, but remains large and statistically significant nonetheless. It
also lowers the effects at lower values of potential experience, but at the same time slightly
increases the wage effects at higher levels of labor market experience.
The next specification in column five additionally allows for cohort-specific returns to ex-
perience by adding interaction terms between the three included polynomial terms of labor
market experience and the year of entry. This accounts for the steady downward shift in re-
turns to experience evident from figure 1. Allowing for varying returns to experience results
in only slightly different estimates, however, when compared to the specification that includes
dummies for year of entry but no interactions with potential experience.
Finally, the sixth specification includes not only a full set of entry-year dummies but also
a full set of calendar-year dummies, thus also accounting for any irregular shifts in average
wages over time that are common across states and not already picked up in the parametric
time trends. This specification yields essentially the same pattern of wage elasticities as the
two preceding specifications.
Table 3
Table 3 shows some simple sensitivity checks with respect to the main regressor, using the
same specification as in column 5 of table 2. In the first column, we use (initial and current)
unemployment rates at the NUTS-3 rather than at the state level (see also footnote 9). In
this case, the cross-sectional dimension of the initial unemployment rate is markedly increased
as there are 35 NUTS-3 regions, compared to only nine states. On the one hand, this should
decrease standard errors because the relevant cross-sectional dimension for the clustering is now
done with 35 instead of 9 regional units. On the other hand, however, using the unemployment
rate at a more disaggregated level may run the risk of being endogenous as workers may move
to regions with lower unemployment (e.g. Wozniak, 2006). Indeed, there is a notable difference
using unemployment rates at different aggregation levels: using the unemployment rate at the
district level results in a smaller initial wage effect and in less persistent overall effects. This
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presumably reflects endogeneity of the local unemployment rate at lower aggregation levels,
resulting from workers moving from regions with high unemployment to regions with lower
levels of unemployment.
The specification in the second column uses state-level youth unemployment rates instead of
overall unemployment rates (again for both initial and current unemployment). The resulting
wage effects are somewhat larger, but still reasonably close to our main estimates based on
overall unemployment rates.
Quantitative Implications: Effects on Discounted Lifetime Earnings
Even though initial wage differentials between entry cohorts apparently fade away as potential
labor market experience increases, our estimates nonetheless imply a non-negligible negative
effect on lifetime earnings from entering the labor market when unemployment is high. This
is illustrated at the bottom of table 2, which shows an approximate estimate for the loss
in lifetime earnings associated with a hypothetical increase in the initial unemployment rate
by one percentage point. The loss in lifetime earnings is computed as the average of the
accumulated wage losses within the first twenty years of labor market experience.
According to our estimates, an increase in the initial local unemployment rate by one
percentage point is associated with an approximate loss in lifetime earnings between 6.4%
and 11.7%, depending on the exact specification of the regression model. Therefore, even in
the longer run, unfavorable labor market entry conditions have a sizeable negative effect on
workers’ earnings.
3.3 How Important is Endogenous Labor Market Entry?
A comparison of our instrumental variable estimates with the same regression specifications
based on simple OLS estimates is informative about the extent of sample selection over the
business cycle. Table 4 therefore compares the estimated semi-elasticities of wages with respect
to the initial unemployment rate for different labor market experiences based on IV estimates
in panel (a) and based on simple OLS estimates in panel (b), for the same six specifications as
in table 2 above (thus panel (a) simply replicates part of table 2).
Table 4
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It is immediately evident that selection is important as there are substantial differences
between the two estimation methods. Wage elasticities based on simple OLS estimates are
much smaller than the corresponding IV elasticities across all specifications and for each value
of labor market experience. For example, while the IV estimates of the most extensive spec-
ification in column (6) imply a large immediate negative effect on wages of -0.128, the corre-
sponding wage effect based on OLS only amounts to -0.020. Similarly, IV estimates imply a
sizeable negative effect on lifetime earnings on the order of 6.5% (specification from column
5), while the corresponding OLS estimates yield a small negative effect of 1.0%. Similar (or
even larger) differences between IV and OLS estimates exist for the other specifications as well,
notwithstanding the fact that IV estimates are much less precise than the corresponding OLS
estimates.
Overall, the comparison of simple OLS and IV estimates makes it clear that there is sub-
stantial sample selection of labor market entrants over fluctuations in local unemployment rates
in our sample. Cohorts who enter the labor force in times of high unemployment are positively
selected, and this selection apparently mutes not only the cyclicality of starting wages with the
business cycle, but also weakens the persistence of this wage effect to a considerable extent.
4 Labor Market Entry Conditions and Quality of First Job
One important mechanism that may explain cohort effects in wages starts with the observation
that there is cyclical variation in job and/or task assignment within jobs over the business cycle
and that high ability workers are assigned to jobs with lower average quality in recessions (e.g.
Devereux, 2000).22 If, moreover, these jobs offer different opportunities for accruing human
capital or if, alternatively, a substantial part of human capital accumulated on the job is specific
to a worker’s task, occupation, and/or industry, then initial job and/or task assignment is
probably able to explain a significant part of the observed persistent wage effects resulting
from unfavorable initial labor market conditions (e.g. Gibbons and Waldman, 2006).23 In
22Our comparison between IV and OLS estimates in section 3.3 above has already shown that labor market
entrants are positively selected in times of high unemployment.
23See Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010) for evidence on task specific, Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) on
occupation specific, and Neal (1995) or Parent (2000) on industry specific human capital. Sullivan (2010)
provides evidence that both occupation and industry specific human capital are simultaneously important for
the level of wages.
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line with these findings, Mansour (2009) finds that the quality of a worker’s first job is lower
when entry is during high unemployment, even though cohorts entering during recession are
positively selected.
Based on this evidence, we provide an additional analysis of the association of initial labor
market conditions and the quality of a worker’s first job in this section. Our empirical measures
for the quality of workers’ first job are employment-weighted industry and employer-specific
wages for both male and female workers aged 22 to 65 (thus excluding labor market entrants
themselves) in any given year.24 Thus, for example, we compute the average wages paid in
industry k and year t as ykt =
∑
i∈k,t(yikt ·eikt)/
∑
i∈k,t eikt, where yikt and eikt are, respectively,
the real daily wage and the number of employment days of worker i of industry k in year t. We
regress each of these measures on the initial local unemployment rate and additional control
variables:
ln(ωi) = ur
0
j[i]α+ xiβ + ψj + ϕt + i, (2)
where ωi denotes the industry or employer-specific wage associated with a worker’s first job,
and where ur0j[i] again denotes the initial local unemployment rate. Additional control variables
are denoted by xi, and ψj and ϕt denote that we also include a full set of dummy variables
indicating state at entry and year of entry into the labor force, respectively. As above, standard
errors are clustered by year at entry × state at entry. We show results with and without
additional firm level controls because of potential endogeneity of employers’ characteristics.
Estimates of α are shown in table 5.
Table 5
The first four columns show the results for industry specific wages.25 There is a significant
and substantial negative effect of initial conditions on the average wage associated with the
industry of the first employer in each of the four specifications. The wage effect resulting
from a one percentage point increases in the initial unemployment rate ranges from -0.019 to
24Mansour (2009), however, uses average occupation-specific wages to measure quality of initial occupational
assignment. We compute industry and firm-specific wages because the ASSD does not contain information
about workers’ occupation (except for the distinction between blue and white-collar jobs).
25The ASSD contains two distinct industry classifications and we report estimates for both. The first, older
classification (wikl) has been replaced by a common classification (nace) used throughout the European Union.
See Zweimu¨ller et al. (2009) for details. The correlation between the two wage measures in our sample is 0.75.
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-0.008. Workers who enter the labor market during high local unemployment thus start their
employment career in industries that pay significantly lower wages on average (again note that
labor market entrants’ wages do not enter the outcome variables).
The remaining two columns show estimates for employer specific wages as outcomes. We
again find a significant and substantial negative effect of the initial local unemployment rate
on employer specific average wages. A one percentage point increase in initial unemployment
predicts that a labor market entrant starts his employment career with an employer who pays
wages that are lower by 2.9% to 3.8%.
Taken together, the results from table 5 point to substantial fluctuations in first job quality
over the business cycle. More specifically, and in line with previous evidence, we find that
workers who enter the labor force during tight labor markets find better paying jobs than
those who enter during times of high unemployment, even though the latter group of workers
is positively selected.
5 Initial Labor Market Conditions and Wage Losses from In-
voluntary First Job Changes
In a recent study, Schmieder and von Wachter (2010) study how wage losses resulting from job
displacement are associated with initial conditions at the start of an employment spell as well
as with the best conditions in the course of the corresponding job. The key idea is that if wage
shortfalls associated with unfavorable entry conditions disappear upon involuntary job loss,
this may be viewed as supportive evidence that these wage losses are unrelated to workers’
underlying productivity. If workers take these initial wage losses along to the next employer,
however, this rather suggests that the initial wage shortfall reflects some difference in underlying
productivity. In this section we draw on this basic idea and study the association between initial
labor market conditions and, respectively, wages with a worker’s new (second) employer and
wage changes from involuntary job changes from the first to the second employer. For those
workers who move from their initial employer to a new firm, we estimate the association of the
initial unemployment rate with both the wage with the old (first) and new (second) employer.
Practically, we first need to determine whether a job change is involuntary or not (while
only focusing on first job changes). One possibility is to focus on job displacement following
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plant closure, which can arguably be seen as involuntary job mobility. However, because only
a few first regular employment spells are actually terminated by a plant closure, we cannot
rely on this identification strategy. Moreover, the ASSD contains no direct information about
the reason for the termination of any employment spell and we thus do not know whether
job changes are voluntary or not. Following Gruetter and Lalive (2009), we therefore try
to discriminate approximately between voluntary and involuntary job changes based on how
the time between the first and second job is spent. Specifically, in what follows, we define
as involuntary job mobility if a worker spends at least one day in registered unemployment
between the first and the second job.26 Based on this distinction, we estimate the following
regression model for different subsets of first job changers:
ωi = ur
0
j[i]α1 + κ(expi)α2 + urj[i]δ + xiβ + ψj + ϕt + i, (3)
where the outcome ωi is either the log real daily wage in the last year of employment with
a worker’s old (first) employer, the log real daily wage in the first year with a worker’s new
(second) employer, or the difference between the two. ur0j[i] is again the initial local unem-
ployment rate, while expi and urj[i] now refer to labor market experience and the current local
unemployment rate in the year of first job change. Additional control variables do not vary
with labor market experience and are denoted by xi. We also include a full set of dummy
variables for year of entry and state at entry.
Table 6
Table 6 shows instrumental variable estimates (using the same strategy as above) of param-
eter α1 for the subset of all first job changes in panel (a) and for involuntary first job changes
only in panel (b). In the following, we focus on the estimates reported in panel (b) which
refer to the subsample of involuntary job moves. Consistent with our main findings (see table
26Table B.1 shows some descriptives for workers who move from their first employer to another employer.
First, workers who voluntarily move to the second employer have a higher wage both at the end of the first and
the beginning of the second employment spell than those who involuntarily change jobs, and thus they also have
larger wage gains from switching employers. The next rows report the number of days spent in either non- or
unemployment between a worker’s first and second job. By definition, the number of registered unemployment
days equals zero for the group of voluntary job changers. Involuntary job changers spent about 76% of the time
between first and second employer in unemployment. There is a significant difference in the overall gap between
first and second job as well. Voluntary (involuntary) job movers spend 185 (593) days out of employment
between their first and second jobs.
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2), the first column shows that the wage with the old (first) employer is negatively associated
with initial labor market conditions. The point estimates implies that a one percentage point
increase in the initial local unemployment rate is associated with 19.4% lower wage at the end
of the first job.
The second column shows how the wage with the new (second) employer depends on the
initial unemployment rate (conditional on current conditions). Interestingly, there is still a
substantial and significant negative association between labor market entry conditions and the
wage with the new employer. The point estimate is -0.106 (with a standard error of 0.013),
thus only about half the size of the corresponding estimate from the first column with respect
to the wage with the old employer. This is an interesting result that has two important
implications. First, it implies that part of the observed wage differences between entry cohorts
reflects underlying differences in human capital. This finding complements and is consistent
with our previous findings on cyclical variation in the quality of initial job assignment. Thus
workers who enter during a recession are initially assigned to lower quality jobs/tasks, and this
initial assignment creates wage persistency because part of the human capital accumulated
with the initial job is specific to this job because of occupation or industry specific human
capital. Second, part of the wage losses associated with poor entry conditions evaporates upon
involuntary job loss and thus part of the observed wage differences appear to be unrelated to
differences in human capital. This implies that mechanisms unrelated to productivity, such as
downwardly rigid wage contracts (Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991), also play an important role
in generating persistent wage differences across entry cohorts.
6 Additional Results
6.1 Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis
This final section presents some additional results that emphasize our interpretation of why
labor market entry conditions generate persistent wage effects. Table 7 shows results for some
distinct subsamples and some alternative specifications. All columns of table 7 use the same
specification as column 5 from table 2.
The first two columns show separate estimates for workers who start their labor market
21
career in either a blue or a white-collar job.27 Even though the initial wage effect is virtually
identical for blue and white-collar workers, the longer-run effect differs substantially between
the two groups. Because there is less persistence in wage losses from poor entry conditions,
the long-run wage effects for white collar workers are only about half the size of those for blue
collar workers (our estimates imply an approximate loss in lifetime earnings of 3.8% and 7.3%,
respectively). This result is somewhat surprising because previous research has shown that
white collar workers in Austria suffer from much larger and more persistent wage losses from
job displacement (Schwerdt et al., 2010). However, in view of our preceding results, this result
emphasizes that initial job assignment and occupation specific human capital are important
in explaining persistent wage effects especially because occupation specific human capital is
arguably more important for blue (e.g. craftsmen) than for white-collar jobs (Sullivan, 2010),
at least in our sample, where the most highly skilled workers are excluded.28
The next three columns show results for native and immigrant workers separately.29 The
comparison between native and immigrant workers shows that there are only small differences
between native and immigrant workers, both in the short and in the long-run: the estimated
loss in lifetime earnings amounts to 6.1% for natives and 6.5% for immigrant workers. The
fifth column additionally shows estimates for the group of immigrant workers from Turkey and
former Yugoslavia, the two largest groups of immigrants in the Austrian labor market (they
account for 57% of all immigrants in our sample). We even find a smaller impact of poor
entry conditions on wages for these workers than for native workers, both in the short and in
the long-run (the estimated loss in lifetime earnings amount to 5.5%, compared to 6.1% for
native workers). As for the comparison between blue and white-collar workers, this contrast
does probably not confirm prior expectations. However, it can again be reconciled with the
argument that immigrant workers probably tend to work in jobs that require less specific skills
and more often involve repetitive tasks.
Table 7
27Note that these two groups do not exactly add up to the overall sample size reported in table 2 because
some employment spells cannot be uniquely identified as either blue or white-collar (see also table 1).
28Moreover, we use a totally different sample of workers. Our study focuses on low and medium-skilled labor
market entrants who entered the labor force between 1978 and 2000, while Schwerdt et al. (2010) focus on prime
age workers of any educational level who experienced a plant closure between 1982 and 1988.
29Note that an immigrant worker is, unlike in the US, an individual who does not possess the Austrian citizen-
ship, but not necessarily an individual born outside of Austria. Consequently, the ASSD contains information
on citizenship but not on country of birth.
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We next split the sample with respect to the initial local unemployment rate. Specifically,
we first compute the deviations in the initial local unemployment rate from its quadratic time
trend (separately for each state). We then run our baseline specification separately for those
observations with positive and negative deviations, respectively, as shown in panel (b) of figure
2. This allows us to study whether there is a symmetric impact of the initial unemployment
rate for those entering in times of either tight or loose labor markets.30 The comparison
between the estimates for the two subsamples shows that there is an asymmetric effect of the
initial local unemployment rate on wages, both in the short and the long-run, and that the
wage loss from entry during unfavorable conditions appears to be larger than the gain from
entry during good aggregate conditions. More specifically, the immediate wage effect of a one
percentage point increase is about twice as large for those observations of workers who enter
at an initial local unemployment rate above its trend than for those below its trend (point
estimate of -0.183 and -0.088, respectively). The same asymmetry holds in the longer run as
well: as shown at the bottom of the table, the estimated loss in lifetime earnings (resulting
from a one percentage point increase in the local unemployment rate) for the former group
amounts to 9.6%, while the loss for the latter group equals 5% only.
This result again supports our view that initial job assignment and human capital ac-
cumulation is probably more important than mechanisms unrelated to productivity because
mechanisms such as implicit contracting models with downward rigid nominal wages are more
likely to predict larger effects for those who enter during a boom than for those who enter
during recession.
6.2 Other Outcomes: Annual Earnings, Unemployment, and Mobility
We next show results for labor market outcomes other than wages in table 8, using exactly the
same specification as in column 5 of table 2. The first column of table 8 shows estimates for
real annual earnings, i.e. the real daily wages times the number of employment days in any
given year. The long run effect is somewhat smaller than the corresponding effect on wages.
This implies that there is a small positive effect on employment from initial labor market
conditions. Consistent with this finding, the second column shows that there is also a small,
30Note that both subsamples contain virtually the full range of both birth and entry cohorts because our
observation period spans several ups and downs in local unemployment rates (again see figure 2).
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but significant negative effect of the initial unemployment rate on the fraction of the year that
is spent in registered unemployment.
Table 8
The remaining three columns show results for different job mobility measures: mobility
across employers, mobility across different industries, and regional mobility.31 In each case,
the corresponding dependent variable is a binary indicator taking on the value one if the
employer (industry, region) in year t is not the same as in year t − 1 (and thus the last
observation year for any individual drops from the analysis). There is a substantial, and
again statistically significant, negative effect of initial conditions on all three mobility measures
considered. For example, a one percentage point increase in the initial unemployment rate
decreases the probability of moving to another employer by about 7.5% (= −0.015/0.202 =
−0.074) in the short and by almost the same amount in the long run. Note that these negative
effects on mobility may explain the positive (negative) effect on employment (unemployment)
because switching employers often involves a period of non or unemployment between two jobs
and because stayers accumulate tenure with the current employer.
Besides the negative effect on wages, labor market entrants starting their employment
career thus not only face lower wages but also considerably lower mobility prospects later
on.32 Reduced mobility probabilities may explain part of the observed wage persistence, since
job mobility is usually associated with wage increases (see also section 5 above). Also, reduced
mobility probabilities are line with our previous argument that occupation and/or industry
specific human capital, combined with initial assignment to lower quality jobs, are responsible
for the persistent wage differentials across labor market entry cohorts.
7 Conclusions
We estimate the long-run impact of initial labor market conditions on wages for young males
entering the Austrian labor market between 1978 and 2000. Consistent with previous evidence,
31Obviously, mobility across industries and/or across regions also implies mobility across different employers,
but not vice versa.
32Our mobility results contrast strongly with those from Bachmann et al. (2010) for Germany (similar results
are reported by Oreopoulos et al. (2006, 2008) for the US), who find that workers entering during poor entry
conditions switch employers more often later on.
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we find a substantial wage penalty from poor entry conditions on starting wages. The estimated
semi-elasticity of starting wages with respect to the initial unemployment rate is on the order of
-0.12 (thus a one percentage point increase in the initial local unemployment rate is associated
with 12% lower starting wages). Moreover, this initial wage loss from first entry into the labor
force during high unemployment turns out to be persistent, and sizeable negative effects on
lifetime earnings thus result. Our preferred instrumental variable estimates imply that an
increase in the initial local unemployment rate by one percentage point is associated with
an approximate loss in lifetime earnings of about 6.5%. We also find that endogenous entry
into the labor market is a substantial issue in the Austrian labor market, biasing simple OLS
estimates towards small initial wage shortfalls and weakly persistent wage effects because of
positive selection in times of high initial unemployment.
How do our results compare to previous findings? We find considerably larger wage effects
than the two other studies for European labor markets, Stevens (2007) for Germany and
Kwon et al. (2010) for Sweden. However, neither of these studies controls for endogenous
labor market entry that is likely to attenuate the initial wage response as well as to weaken
the persistence of the wage loss stemming from aggregate conditions. Our comparison between
IV with simple OLS estimates shows that there is considerable positive selection in times of
poor entry conditions, and OLS estimates amount to at most 20% of the corresponding IV
estimates. Indeed, our OLS estimates are close to the results reported in Stevens (2007) and
Kwon et al. (2010).33
We further show evidence that is consistent with cyclical variation in the quality of a
worker’s first regular employment, measured by industry and employer specific wages. Thus,
even though workers are positively selected in times of high unemployment, they are assigned to
industries and/or employers that generally pay lower wages. An additional and complementary
analysis of the association of wage losses resulting from involuntary first job changes with initial
labor market conditions supports the view that initial job and/or task assignment within jobs
is important in explaining the wage persistence we observe. These two findings are also well in
line with several findings from our subsample analysis. Specifically, we find that wage losses are
substantially larger for blue than for white-collar workers, that wage losses are larger for natives
33Our finding of persistent wage effects from poor entry conditions are also in line with Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter
et al. (2010) who study labor earnings mobility in Austria using the same data source as we do, but a completely
different empirical approach.
25
than for immigrants overall as well as immigrants from Turkey and former Yugoslavia, and
that wage losses for those entering during above-trend initial unemployment are twice as large
as the corresponding wage gains for those workers entering during below-trend unemployment.
We further find that unfavorable entry conditions have a negative effect on workers’ mobility
as well. Again, this is consistent with the view that a significant part of human capital that
accrued on-the-job is occupation and/or industry-specific and that workers are assigned to jobs
or tasks of lower average quality during recession. Taken together, these results clearly suggest
that initial job assignment is part of the explanation behind cohort wage effects. On the
other hand, we have also shown that part of the initial wage gain resulting from labor market
entry during good conditions is lost when switching to another employer. This suggests that
mechanisms unrelated to workers’ productivity, such as downwardly rigid wage contracts or
match specific rents, nonetheless also play a role in generating the observed cohort effects in
wages.
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Table 1: Summary statistics, male labor market entrants 1978–2000
Mean Standard deviation
Individual-level characteristics:
Real daily wage 48.182 15.448
Age at start of first regular job 19.194 1.007
Age at first entry into the labor force 18.659 1.456
Duration of first regular job (years) 2.836 4.321
Any unemployment before first job 0.307 0.461
Unemployment days before first job 42.703 101.405
Blue-collar 0.744 0.437
White-collar 0.253 0.435
Aggregate-level variables:
State level unemployment rate 6.597 2.897
State level youth unemployment rate 4.942 1.790
NUTS-3 level unemployment rate 6.655 3.157
NUTS-3 level youth unemployment rate 4.958 2.136
Number of entrants aged 15-21 3, 766.782 1, 450.335
Firm-level characteristics:
Number of employees (in 100’s) 5.777 24.667
Female share of workforce 0.244 0.219
Region of employer:
Vienna 0.179 0.383
Lower Austria 0.173 0.378
Burgenland 0.025 0.156
Upper Austria 0.193 0.395
Styria 0.148 0.355
Carinthia 0.067 0.250
Salzburg 0.071 0.256
Tyrol 0.092 0.290
Vorarlberg 0.053 0.223
Industry of employer:
Agriculture 0.010 0.100
Electricity 0.010 0.100
Mining 0.008 0.087
Manufacturing 0.418 0.493
Construction 0.202 0.401
Wholesale and retail trade 0.159 0.365
Gastronomy, hotel business 0.044 0.205
Transportation 0.038 0.191
Finance 0.059 0.236
Cleaning, body care 0.008 0.088
Arts, entertainment, sports 0.005 0.071
Healthcare, welfare 0.007 0.082
Education, research 0.005 0.069
Lobbies, social security agencies 0.027 0.163
Housekeeping 0.000 0.022
Number of observations 220,214
Notes: The four unemployment rates are computed from the individual-level raw data
of the ASSD. See also notes of table A.1.
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Table 2: The long-run wage effects of initial labor market conditions (IV estimates)
ln(real daily wage)
Mean 4.257
Standard deviation 0.380
ur0 −0.270??? −0.360??? −0.209??? −0.111??? −0.124??? −0.128???
(0.061) (0.091) (0.073) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
exp · ur0 0.039??? 0.052??? 0.031??? 0.014??? 0.020??? 0.017???
(0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
exp2 · ur0 −0.002??? −0.003??? −0.002??? −0.001??? −0.002??? −0.001???
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
exp3 · ur0 0.000??? 0.000??? 0.000??? 0.000??? 0.000??? 0.000???
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
εyur(0) −0.270??? −0.360??? −0.209??? −0.111??? −0.124??? −0.128???
(0.061) (0.091) (0.073) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
εyur(5) −0.130??? −0.170??? −0.095?? −0.064??? −0.059??? −0.069???
(0.030) (0.043) (0.037) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
εyur(10) −0.074??? −0.089??? −0.047?? −0.050??? −0.045??? −0.049???
(0.017) (0.023) (0.020) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
εyur(15) −0.069??? −0.077??? −0.038?? −0.051??? −0.053??? −0.048???
(0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
εyur(20) −0.083??? −0.089??? −0.038?? −0.051??? −0.056??? −0.049???
(0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
urt, urt · κ(exp) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of entry No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year of entry · κ(exp) No No No No Yes No
Calendar year No No No No No Yes
Number of observations 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075
Adjusted R-Squared 0.154 0.072 0.299 0.348 0.348 0.348
Loss in lifetime earnings 0.117 0.146 0.079 0.064 0.065 0.067
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered by state at entry × year of entry. exp and
ur0 denote potential labor market experience (in years) and the initial unemployment rate, respectively.
εyur(k) denotes the estimated semi-elasticity of wages with respect to the initial unemployment rate, eval-
uated at k years of potential labor market experience. urt denotes the current unemployment rate. The
initial unemployment rate (and the interactions with labor market experience) are instrumented with the
unemployment rate at age 16 (and the corresponding interactions with labor market experience).
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Table 3: Sensitivity analysis (IV estimates)
ln(real daily wage)
District-level ur Youth ur
Mean 4.257 4.257
Standard deviation 0.381 0.380
ur0 −0.049??? −0.130???
(0.005) (0.019)
exp · ur0 0.012??? 0.017???
(0.001) (0.003)
exp2 · ur0 −0.001??? −0.001???
(0.000) (0.000)
exp3 · ur0 0.000??? 0.000???
(0.000) (0.000)
εyur(0) −0.049??? −0.130???
(0.005) (0.019)
εyur(5) −0.013??? −0.072???
(0.002) (0.011)
εyur(10) −0.010??? −0.057???
(0.001) (0.008)
εyur(15) −0.020??? −0.062???
(0.001) (0.008)
εyur(20) −0.025??? −0.064???
(0.002) (0.007)
Number of observations 3,267,615 3,349,075
Adjusted R-Squared 0.354 0.349
Loss in lifetime earnings 0.021 0.075
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are given in
parentheses and are clustered on state (district) at entry times year
of entry. exp and ur0 denote potential labor market experience (in
years) and the initial unemployment rate, respectively. εyur(k) de-
notes the estimated semi-elasticity of wages with respect to the initial
unemployment rate, evaluated at k years of potential labor market
experience. The initial unemployment rate (and the interactions
with labor market experience) are instrumented with the unemploy-
ment rate at age 16 (and the corresponding interactions with labor
market experience). Both columns use the same regression specifi-
cation as in column 5 of table 2.
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Table 4: Comparison between IV and OLS estimates
(a) Semi-elasticities based on IV estimates
εyur(0) −0.270??? −0.360??? −0.209??? −0.111??? −0.124??? −0.128???
(0.061) (0.091) (0.073) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
εyur(5) −0.130??? −0.170??? −0.095?? −0.064??? −0.059??? −0.069???
(0.030) (0.043) (0.037) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
εyur(10) −0.074??? −0.089??? −0.047?? −0.050??? −0.045??? −0.049???
(0.017) (0.023) (0.020) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
εyur(15) −0.069??? −0.077??? −0.038?? −0.051??? −0.053??? −0.048???
(0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
εyur(20) −0.083??? −0.089??? −0.038?? −0.051??? −0.056??? −0.049???
(0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Loss in lifetime earnings 0.117 0.146 0.079 0.064 0.065 0.067
(b) Semi-elasticities based on OLS estimates
εyur(0) −0.011??? −0.011??? −0.014??? −0.022??? −0.021??? −0.020???
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
εyur(5) 0.003
??? 0.003??? 0.002 −0.006??? −0.004?? −0.008???
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
εyur(10) 0.002
? 0.002?? 0.001 −0.006??? −0.003?? −0.009???
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
εyur(15) −0.004??? −0.003??? −0.005??? −0.013??? −0.011??? −0.015???
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
εyur(20) −0.004?? −0.003? −0.005??? −0.013??? −0.017??? −0.015???
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Loss in lifetime earnings 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.011 0.010 0.013
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
urt, urt · κ(exp) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of entry No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year of entry · κ(exp) No No No No Yes No
Calendar year No No No No No Yes
Notes: εyur(k) denotes the estimated semi-elasticity of wages with respect to the initial unemployment rate,
evaluated at k years of potential labor market experience. See also notes of table 2.
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Table 6: Initial labor market conditions and wages before and after first job changes (IV
estimates)
Dependent variable ln(yold) ln(ynew) ∆ ln(y)
(a) All first job changes
ur0 −0.182??? −0.120??? 0.062???
(0.016) (0.011) (0.009)
Mean 3.970 4.094 0.124
Standard deviation 0.426 0.376 0.415
Adjusted R-Squared 0.444 0.191 0.152
Number of observations 182,922 182,922 182,922
(b) Involuntary first job changes only
ur0 −0.194??? −0.106??? 0.088???
(0.020) (0.013) (0.012)
Mean 3.963 4.043 0.080
Standard deviation 0.395 0.358 0.427
Adjusted R-Squared 0.365 0.117 0.128
Number of observations 90,297 90,297 90,297
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes
State-specific trends Yes Yes Yes
Individual and firm level controls Yes Yes Yes
Entry-year Yes Yes Yes
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered by
year of entry × state at entry. yold and ynew denote, respectively, the real daily
wage with the old (first) and the new (second) employer after first job change.
∆ ln(y) equals the difference between ln(ynew) and ln(yold). ur0 denotes the initial
local unemployment rate.
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Figure 2: Fluctuations in state-level unemployment rates, 1972–2005
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Notes: The figure shows male unemployment rates for workers aged between 15 and 65, aggregated
at the level of the state (“Bundesland”) and computed from the individual-level raw data of the
ASSD. Two of the nine states are graphically highlighted. “Vorarlberg” is situated in the western
part of Austria (bordering Germany and Switzerland). “Burgenland” is located at the eastern border
of Austria (bordering Hungary in the east and Slovenia in the south). Panel (b) shows deviations
from state-specific quadratic time trends.
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A Sample Construction
We first determine the start of the first regular employment spell for each male individual
born between 1958 and 1985.34 The restriction with respect to year of birth, in combination
with the restriction on age at beginning of one’s first regular job that we apply below, ensures
that the potential range of age at first entry into the labor force is the same for each entry
cohort considered in the analysis (1978–2000). Additionally, we drop all individuals who were
self-employed and/or worked as a farmer or civil servant at least once, because the data do not
consistently cover these employment spells over the whole period of analysis and/or because
earnings are not recorded (in the case of self-employment). We thus cannot fully observe the
employment and/or earnings histories of such individuals.
We then determine each individual’s age at the start of his first regular employment spell
starting between 1978 and 2000. We define regular employment as an employment spell which
lasts for at least 180 days.35 We also focus on individuals aged between 16 and 21 years at the
start of their first regular employment spell. This leaves us with 797,846 unique individuals
(see table A.1), from which we take a simple 30% random sample. This finally yields a total of
220,214 unique individuals and 3,349,075 observations (= individuals × years) when following
these individuals over time.
Table A.1
Table A.1 shows descriptive statistics for some key variables, by individuals’ age at the
time of first entry into the labor force. We consistently exclude individuals who start their first
regular employment after they attain age 30 because they presumably never enter the labor
force at all.36 The first column of table A.1 shows descriptives for all individuals, the second
(third) column shows descriptives for individuals aged 16 to 21 (aged 22 to 30) when starting
their first employment. A comparison of the second to the third column shows that our sample
restriction with respect to age at the start of first regular employment works as expected. The
sample of lower skilled workers, compared to the group of higher skilled workers, contains a
higher fraction of blue-collar workers, has considerably lower wages on average, and shorter
duration of the first regular employment spell.
Also note that, for the group of individuals aged between 22 and 30 when first entering the
labor force, highly skilled workers potentially are mixed up with low-skilled workers: individuals
in this group of workers either spent much time in education, were previously unemployed, or
had short employment spells not counting as regular employment. This is apparent from the
proportion of workers below the lower censoring point or above the higher censoring point.
The probability of crossing any of the two points is higher for the sample of older workers.
Consequently, the variation in the real daily wage (and thus productivity) is considerably
smaller in the sample of younger workers than in the group of older workers.
34Obviously, an individual must be covered by the ASSD in order to be included in the sample. An individual
is covered by the ASSD if he or she is entitled to future social security benefits (typically old-age benefits) or
has already claimed social security benefits before first entering the labor force. Typically individuals “enter”
the ASSD once they start working.
35Importantly, vocational training such as apprenticeship training is not considered as regular employment
(but as formal training).
36The group of individuals who enter at a later age probably consists of two very different groups, who are
indistinguishable from each other in the data. On the one hand there are truly high-skilled workers who enter
the labor market at a later stage because they continued their education until that time. On the other hand,
however, there are also low-skilled workers who were never employed or only sporadically employed before
starting their first regular employment. Because schooling is not directly observed, we would mix these two
groups of workers together if we were to include them.
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Table A.1: Sample selection
Age at start of first regular employment
16-30 16-21 22-30
Real daily wage 50.488 (18.644) 47.536 (15.303) 56.742 (23.027)
Age at start of first job 20.863 (2.948) 19.200 (1.004) 24.386 (2.589)
Duration of first regular job 2.800 (3.995) 2.692 (4.035) 3.030 (3.900)
Blue-collar 0.650 (0.477) 0.726 (0.446) 0.487 (0.500)
White-collar 0.348 (0.476) 0.271 (0.445) 0.510 (0.500)
Below GfGr: Yes = 1 0.059 (0.235) 0.050 (0.219) 0.077 (0.266)
Above HBGr: Yes = 1 0.049 (0.215) 0.019 (0.135) 0.112 (0.315)
Region of employer:
Vienna 0.239 (0.426) 0.198 (0.398) 0.326 (0.469)
Lower Austria 0.158 (0.365) 0.171 (0.377) 0.129 (0.336)
Burgenland 0.024 (0.152) 0.000 (0.000) 0.021 (0.142)
Upper Austria 0.168 (0.374) 0.183 (0.387) 0.137 (0.344)
Styria 0.139 (0.346) 0.145 (0.352) 0.129 (0.335)
Carinthia 0.065 (0.246) 0.066 (0.249) 0.062 (0.241)
Salzburg 0.070 (0.255) 0.071 (0.257) 0.067 (0.249)
Tyrol 0.090 (0.286) 0.091 (0.288) 0.087 (0.282)
Vorarlberg 0.000 (0.000) 0.049 (0.217) 0.000 (0.000)
Industry of employer:
Agriculture 0.015 (0.120) 0.012 (0.108) 0.021 (0.142)
Electricity 0.007 (0.085) 0.009 (0.095) 0.003 (0.057)
Mining 0.006 (0.078) 0.007 (0.082) 0.005 (0.068)
Manufacturing 0.344 (0.475) 0.401 (0.490) 0.225 (0.417)
Construction 0.165 (0.371) 0.190 (0.392) 0.114 (0.318)
Wholesale and retail trade 0.150 (0.357) 0.159 (0.366) 0.130 (0.336)
Gastronomy, hotel business 0.060 (0.237) 0.046 (0.209) 0.089 (0.285)
Transportation 0.059 (0.236) 0.060 (0.238) 0.057 (0.233)
Finance 0.082 (0.274) 0.058 (0.235) 0.130 (0.337)
Cleaning, body care 0.009 (0.096) 0.008 (0.089) 0.012 (0.109)
Arts, entertainment, sports 0.010 (0.102) 0.005 (0.072) 0.021 (0.145)
Healthcare, welfare 0.014 (0.116) 0.006 (0.079) 0.029 (0.167)
Education, research 0.015 (0.121) 0.000 (0.000) 0.037 (0.189)
Lobbies, social security agencies 0.063 (0.243) 0.033 (0.180) 0.125 (0.331)
Housekeeping 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.022) 0.000 (0.000)
Number of observations 1,174,523 797,846 376,677
Notes: Table entries are sample means and standard deviations (in parentheses). Daily wages are given in Euros. Real
wage are deflated using the consumer price index with base year 2007. GfGr (“Gerinfu¨gigkeitsgrenze”) and HBGr
(“Ho¨chstbemessungsgrundlage”) denote the upper and the lower censoring point with respect to earnings, respectively.
“Below GfGr” is an indicator taking on the value 1 if the nominal daily wage is equal to or below 1.2 times the lower
censoring point and 0 otherwise. “Above HBGr” is an indicator taking on the value 1 if the nominal daily wage is
equal to or above 0.8 times the upper censoring point and 0 otherwise.
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B Additional Tables
Table B.1: Summary statistics, first job changes
Type of job change
All Involuntary
Voluntary
All Immediate
(a) Wages, first and second employer
Wage, first employer 57.304 56.158 58.421 66.364
(21.609) (18.984) (23.840) (25.536)
Wage, second employer 63.762 60.153 67.279 73.903
(21.344) (18.604) (23.177) (24.464)
Wage change 6.458 3.995 8.859 7.539
(18.695) (19.264) (17.798) (15.168)
(b) Time between first and second job
Non-employment days 386.737 593.257 185.397 0.000
(802.105) (936.724) (577.105) (0.000)
Unemployment days 65.688 133.066 0.000 0.000
(136.320) (169.348) (0.000) (0.000)
Fraction unemployed 0.379 0.768 0.000 0.000
(2.218) (3.109) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of observations 182,922 90,297 92,621 37,900
Notes: Table entries are means and standard deviations (in parentheses). Panel (a) shows wages in
the last year (first year) of the old (new) employer as well as the difference between the two. Panel
(b) shows the number of days spent in nonemployment and unemployment, respectively, between a
worker’s first and second job since entry into the labor force. Involuntary job changes are those with at
least one unemployment day between first and second job. Immediate voluntary job changes are those
with zero gap between first and second job.
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